

FIRST EDITION THE WAR IN EUROPE. PREVOST-PARADOL'S OPINION. France Must Fight Prussia. The Struggle Inevitable And Victory Certain. The French in Rome. Preparing for Evacuation. A History of the Occupation. The Two Napoleons and the Church England Getting Ready to Fight Etc., Etc., Etc., Etc., Etc.

THE FRENCH IN ROME.

Proposed Evacuation of the Eternal City.—The Franco-Prussian War knocks the props from under the Pope. The French Occupation—When it Commenced—The Napoleonic Dynasty and the Church of Rome—The Glorious Prospects of Pope Pius IX. The early evacuation of Rome by the French troops has been anticipated as one of the consequences of the war between France and Prussia, and the rumors that have reached us by the cable render it probable that the Pope will be abandoned by his protectors within a few days. On Friday last M. Ollivier had an interview with the leading editors of Paris for the purpose of explaining the position of the French Government with regard to the secret treaty proposed to Prussia in 1866, and he took occasion also to allude to Rome and definitely indicated the intention of the French Government to withdraw its troops, by saying that "it has seemed equitable and useful to the French Government to evacuate Rome—equitable, because Italy has kept her promise; useful, because keeping our promises unites us more closely to Italy and Austria." It is impossible to tell what the ultimate consequences of this movement will be, or what will be the fate of the Pope, who in all probability will be compelled to abandon both Rome and Italy.

The French occupation of Rome forms a curious chapter in modern history, and it is a curious illustration of a certain line of policy inaugurated by the first Napoleon and carried out fully by his nephew. In 1797 Rome was captured by the armies of the French Republic, who sent the Pope to France and proclaimed a Roman republic. This was suppressed in 1799, and the Pope returned. In 1808, however, Napoleon took possession of the city with his troops, and in the year following he annexed it to his empire. This may be considered as the commencement of the French occupation of Rome, which ended with the fall of the first Napoleon, but which was revived as soon as his nephew came into power. All religion had been abolished under the republic, and Napoleon, with the far-sightedness of a great statesman, knew that its re-establishment would aid him in consolidating his power more than any other influence he could bring to bear. The revival of religion meant the restoration of law and order, and if he could absolutely control the Church he felt that the stability of his empire would be secured beyond any ordinary contingencies. Unfortunately for Napoleon the Pope could neither be bullied nor persuaded to countenance many of his schemes, and he therefore failed to secure him as a cordial ally ready at all times to wield the thunders of the Vatican for the purpose of terrifying the enemies of France. Pius VII was in reality held as a prisoner in France from 1809 until the abdication of the Emperor in 1814, when he returned to Rome. From that time until the revolutionary movements of 1848 nothing of moment occurred to disturb the temporal power of the successors of St. Peter.

On the accession of Pope Pius IX in 1846 great hopes were entertained that he would make a decided effort to reform the gigantic abuses of the Papal Government. The new Pope was believed to be inspired by liberal sentiments, and he was one of the most popular men in Italy. The news of his election to the papal chair created the greatest enthusiasm throughout the whole Italian peninsula. The breaking out of the French revolution in 1848 gave a powerful impulse to the enthusiasm, not only of the Italian patriots, but of the friends of liberal institutions throughout Europe, awakening a demand not for mere administrative reforms, but for more popular systems of representative government. These sweeping changes the Pope was not prepared to support, and from that moment his popularity began to decline. A policy of reaction commenced which only widened the breach between the Papal Government and the people, and gave a new impetus to the demand for organic changes. The popular disaffection was returned to him in the ministerial change of June 3, 1850. General Leobrun was elected a member of the General Council of Rome for the Canton of Tron Officer of the Legion of Honor, 1840, commander 11th August, 1850, was made Grand Officer 25th August, 1850, and received the Grand Cross 21st December, 1869. He was created a Marshal of France in March, 1870. This change of the Minister of War to a Marshal was not approved of by the army, because of a supposed want of experience, but the will of Napoleon and the claims of his high position as minister overcame all opposition. The General is said to be physically the biggest man in the French army. The world will soon have a chance to see for itself whether he is competent for the high position which he has now reached. General Charles Augustus Frossard, who is now in command of the 2d Corps, at St. Avold, was born April 26th, 1807, was from

Louis Napoleon was at this time President of the French republic, and was secretly arranging his plans for the re-establishment of the empire. Like his uncle, he was eager to obtain the moral support of the Church of Rome, and he accordingly answered the Pope's appeal by sending a body of troops under General Oudinot, which landed at Civita Vecchia on the 29th of April, 1849, and immediately marched upon Rome. The city, which was in possession of the native troops under Garibaldi, was besieged and was finally captured on the 1st of July. The Pope fled to the left, where he had been for some time residing, on the 4th of April, 1850, escorted by Neapolitan and French dragoons. He entered Rome on the 13th of April, and declared a partial amnesty to his political opponents. His progressive tendencies had been thoroughly checked, however, and he has never since shown a disposition to reign as a constitutional monarch. The French garrison was maintained, and Napoleon III, by the practical support he has given to the Pope, has enabled him to remain in Rome as its ruler, in spite of the wishes of the Italian liberals, who look upon Rome as the only proper capital of their country, and who consider that the possession of the powers of a temporal prince by the Pope interferes with his legitimate functions as the head of the Church.

At the time of the treaty of Villafranca, after the Italian war of 1859, it was proposed to establish a confederation of the Italian States under the honorary presidency of the Pope. This project, however, was abandoned, and the kingdom of Italy was established, with Victor Emmanuel at its head, but the French garrison still maintaining the supremacy of the Pope in the Roman territory. In consideration of the assistance he received from France, the King of Italy guaranteed to protect Rome from the attacks of the Italian liberals. This he has done, and between Victor Emmanuel and Napoleon III the Red Republicans have been uniformly repulsed in all their attempts to gain possession of the Eternal City. The French Emperor has repeatedly threatened to withdraw his troops, but has refrained from doing so at the entreaty of the Pope, who fears that the Italian Government will, when left to itself, not take much trouble to carry out its engagements. In compliance with the treaty of 1859 the French garrison was indeed withdrawn for a time, but the attack upon Rome by the Garibaldians in September and October, 1867, induced the Emperor to again intervene, and a French expeditionary force was landed at Civita Vecchia on the 30th of October. The Garibaldians were defeated at Mentana on the 3rd of November, and when the danger was past the bulk of the French force retired from Rome, leaving, however, a garrison for the protection of the Pope. This garrison it is now proposed to withdraw, and in the event of a general European conflict growing out of the war between France and Prussia, it is not easy to foretell what the fate of the Pope will be. With France at war with the most powerful military nation in Europe, the King of Italy will require considerable fortitude and more respect for the Pope than he has yet shown to refrain from seizing Rome, and it is scarcely possible that he will allow the opportunity to pass unimproved. In the event of the French abandonment of Rome it is said that the Pope intends to retire to the island of Malta, but it is probable that he has not yet been able to make any definite plans for the future, or to arrange for an abiding place in case he is obliged to turn his back upon Rome.

FRENCH GENERALS.

Sketches of Generals Lebovin, Frossard, and Bourbaki. Below we give sketches of three leading French generals who are destined to figure prominently in the war. General Edmond Lebovin, who was recently commissioned as Major-General by the Emperor, and holds the chief command of the army under the latter, being charged with the general outlines of the French campaign, was born on November 5, 1809. He was educated in the Polytechnic School and at the military and artillery school at Metz or Mayence, which town is now in the very heart of the district where the principal operations will take place during the campaign on which he is now engaged. He graduated in 1833 and immediately became a lieutenant of artillery. For service at the engagement of the Iron Gates in Algeria, which attracted the attention of the Orleans princes, he obtained the rank of captain in 1837. From 1848 to 1850 he was second in command of the Polytechnic School. He became chief of escadron in 1846, and colonel in 1852. In 1854 he went to the Crimea as head of the artillery staff, with the rank of general of brigade or major-general. He took a prominent part in the battle of Alma, and was made general of division or lieutenant-general in 1857. In the Italian campaign of 1859 the whole of the artillery was placed under his supreme command. The French say that the success at the battle of Solferino was due in great measure to the timely aid of Lebovin in bringing up an overwhelming number of guns to bear on the Austrian right. General Lebovin afterwards became aid-de-camp to the Emperor and member of the Artillery Committee. In 1866 he was sent to Venice as Imperial Commissioner, and in 1867 was sent to replace General De Goyon at Toulouse, and to command the 6th Army Corps. By an imperial decree in the same year he was called to succeed Marshal Niel as Minister of War and member of the Cabinet, which offices were made vacant by the death of that personage. These are now again vacated by the departure of the incumbent to supervising the campaign. The Cabinet office Lebovin had before resigned to make way for the new Cabinet combination of M. Emile Ollivier, but his portfolio was returned to him in the ministerial change of June 3, 1870. General Lebovin was elected a member of the General Council of Rome for the Canton of Tron Officer of the Legion of Honor, 1840, commander 11th August, 1850, was made Grand Officer 25th August, 1850, and received the Grand Cross 21st December, 1869.

THE FUTURE OF FRANCE.

Views of the Late Prevost-Paradol.—The Last Chapter of His Work on "La Nouvelle France." The chances of Victory or Defeat.—The Principle of Nationalities. In 1866 the late M. Prevost-Paradol published a work entitled "La Nouvelle France," in which he traced the possible destiny of his country. From the closing chapter of this work we take the following extracts:— "Which is the result of the events of 1848 for France? Where do those events carry us? Is Prussia going to follow in peace her invading march through Germany, or shall we attempt to stop it at least to ensure the safety of our frontiers? Which one of these alternatives must we choose? Let us submit these two hypotheses to a rapid survey. Let us suppose first that Prussia, Germany and France, whatever may be the pretext or occasion of it, will be victorious over Prussia. The result will be, in the first place, a question and doubt does not for a moment cease to haunt us. The changes that our state of affairs has undergone of late years. Not long ago, when there was question about the military power of the States of the Continent, the only question we propounded to ourselves was whether France would be able to resist the aggression of Prussia. The question is whether France could resist the single power of Prussia, and, furthermore, there is no one who does not regard the utmost respect for a trial of arms as it may be, shall either be defeated or we shall win. Let us take up first the former, and by far the most likely, of the two hypotheses. Suppose we get it. What would we do with it? The principle of the nationalities, which theoretically is the main-spring of our politics, but of the benefit of which we never avail ourselves, while leaving others to do it, as M. Thiers eloquently said, this principle calls for two conditions for making the annexation of territory a permanent and profitable affair: first, the identity of race or of tongue, and, secondly, the consent of the people thereof. Prussia, of course, does not regard the rights of the sections of her new empire when she embosoms them with it; and as for her retention of the duchies of Posen and Silesia, which she has never altogether dispensed with identity and consent. But suppose we are to imitate Prussia and apply the principle of the nationalities according to her own notions. Suppose that we consent to be friendly on our attitude towards Belgium, and that we should drop away the consent of the last to incorporate the provinces of Belgium, which we should altogether disregard both the identity and the consent of the Belgian provinces, or else that we (however great may be the blunder) should build up a state of the Rhine, which we should not allow to belong to her, and that it would be so easy to keep it as an independent State, as to keep it for Prussia? It is very easy to say, but the use of the victory would be a most difficult task, for to apply the principle of the nationalities to the Prussian empire, we should plainly to seize and keep important conquests at the expense of all Europe; and, on the other hand, to apply it faithfully, it is to want annexations under the only conditions of identity and consent, and to withdraw from the battle-field with empty hands, and, therefore, to open the way to Prussia to her further aggression in Germany, as soon as she shall get over our first blow. The Frenchmen who like their actual government, feel so much sympathy for the nationalities, seem to have never thought that they want what it is to throw the world in the arms of Prussia, thus offering a reasonable pretext to the annexation of the Rhine, and, in fact, to the union of Europe should be reconstructed in consonance with this principle, it is France that will inevitably be the loser. It is very easy to say, but the two only points of the European continent to which we might apply to our profit the principle of the nationalities, at least in the name of France, are Belgium and Switzerland. But, then, in exchange for the expatriation of this small number of European speaking people, we should have to be obliged to allow, sooner or later, the union in a single state of 10,000,000 of German-speaking people (not even including Alsace, and, besides it, the union of all Slavonic peoples). We are, therefore, obliged to confess that the principle of the nationalities, even when applied by us to our own benefit, does not lessen the humiliation of France. After all, in case of success against Prussia, it is not the principle of the nationalities, but the principle, and to which we are to give the right of the victor, bounded, as otherwise, by the general consent of the nations. But, in truth, even so considered, the victory would not avail us by its actual and prospective embarrassments, for the principle of the nationalities, which we have so long encouraged, would continue to keep the world in trouble, in spite of our too late repenting; the movement of the German unity, excited by the victory itself, would follow on its way sooner or later, and this happy effort of France would rather support than stop altogether the march of events. Be it, however, that this strife becomes inevitable on account of our blunders; it should bear us only the trophies of the victory; victory may be unfruitful, and we must now consider the hypothesis of a defeat. Let us suppose, at the moment that Prussia is alone or aided by Russia, should win it. We do not need to insist long in showing that it would be the ruin of France. 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